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A consumer credit reform movement has been mobilizing to restrict
or abolish remedies such as the cognovit note, balloon clause, deficiency
judgment, wage garnishment, holder in due course status, and repos-
session without hearing. Momentum has been added by recent judicial
decisions such as Fuentes v. Shevin,1 in which replevin without notice
in most circumstances was declared unconstitutional. But some com-
mentators2 have objected that the ultimate effect of such reform may
be to limit the amount of credit available to low-income consumers.
Critics contend that limiting the creditor's ability to coerce repayment
will increase creditor cost, thereby increasing the price or reducing the
volume of credit available, with the most severe effects falling on low-
income borrowers. Three assumptions underlie much of the past criti-
cism of consumer credit reform: First, that restrictions on creditor
remedies, such as those noted above, will increase the price or reduce
the volume of credit; second, that such tampering with consumer sov-
ereignty will result in allocative inefficiency in the credit market; and
third, that this increase in price or reduction in volume of credit will
disproportionately affect low-income consumers and thus offend our
sense of distributive justice. This article will question the accuracy of
the first assumption, and suggest that gains in allocative efficiency and
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point, compare Kripke, Credit Oriented, at 485 with Kripke, Gesture, at 33 p.142. For
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increases in distributive justice may result even if reform increases the
price or reduces the volume of credit.3
I. Consumer Credit Reform and the Price and Volume of Credit
The assumption that consumer credit reform will increase the price
or reduce the volume of credit rests upon two minor premises: First,
that significant reform will be costly to the creditor; and second, that
he will respond by either raising the price or reducing the volume of
credit offered. While there is some empirical evidence supporting these
premises, there is also some to the contrary, and their validity is at best
uncertain.
A. The Probability that Reform will be Costly to the Creditor
Significant reform need not increase creditor costs. Additional costs
will result only if reform leads to a higher rate of default, greater quan-
tities of uncollectible debts, or more costly collection procedures.
1. Will reform increase the rate of default?
Those who contend that a significant reduction in coercive creditor
remedies will increase the rate of default find in the present legal sys.
tem elements of moral suasion, deterrence, and coercion which
prompt the debtor to meet his obligations. They appear to reason that
if creditor remedies are restricted, the legal system will no longer sup-
port the principle that debts must be repaid, deter default through
fear, or coerce repayment through direct sanctions. As a result, the
rate of default will increase.4
3. Traces of the approach taken by this paper can be found in a number of articles,
although none seem to have fully acknowledged the nature of the reform decision nor
examined it in much detail. See Dam, Consumer Protection: An Overview, 39 A.B.A.
ANTITRUST L.J. 917 (1970); Leff, Injury, Ignorance and Spite: The Dynamics of Coercive
Collection, 80 YALE L.J. 1 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Leff, Spite]; Slawson, Standard Form
Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529 (1971);
Resort to the Legal Process in Collecting Debts from High Risk Credit Buyers in Los
Angeles-Alternative Methods for Allocating Present Costs, 14 U.C.L.A, L. REv. 879
(1967) [hereinafter cited as U.C.L.A. Project]. See also Buchanan, In Defense of Caveat
Emptor, 38 U. Cm. L. REV. 64 (1970).
An analogy to accident costs underlies the use I have made of Professor Calabresi's
book in developing this analysis. While I will not frequently cite him hereafter, I owe
him a great debt. See G. CALABRESi, THE Costs oF ACCIDENTS (1970).
4. Professor Andenaes speaks of the "moral influence of the criminal law" and the
"moral or socio-pedagogical influence" when he describes an analogous effect on critni.
nal behavior. See Andenaes, The General Preventive Effects of Punishment, 114 U. PA. L.
REv. 949 (1966) [hereinafter cited as General Preventive]. The parallel concept in An-
denaes' writings is "mere deterrence." See id. at 950. It would be problematic to analogize
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Yet it seems just as reasonable to assume that the debtor's own moral-
ity and sense of obligation, and those of his community, are equally
determinative of whether or not he repays.; There appears to be a clear
consensus among almost all segments of society regardless of the effi-
cacy of official sanctions, that obligations must be fulfilled.0 Professor
Caplovitz found a strong willingness among debtors to meet their obli-
gations, even in the face of adversity, despite an absence of effective
legal sanctions against nonpayment.7 The moral and deterrent impact
of creditor remedies may depend less on their severity than on their
efficacy in reinforcing ethical motivation and social disapproval, and
their certainty of enforcement." For example, there is evidence that
debtors find the mere service of process to be a powerful impetus to
repayment.9
Finally, it seems likely that significant non-legal sanctions would
operate through credit-rating systems even in the absence of legal co-
ercion. A restriction of creditor remedies should encourage the develop-
ment of more accurate credit bureaus, providing information that
should permit the identification of high-risk debtors, particularly those
with a history of delinquency. In this way, if legal regulation subsides,
informal regulation through the market should continue to provide a
substantial deterrent to defaults.' 0 Thus, without empirical support it
the deterrent impact of criminal law sanctions to the credit s)stem, because it is not
known how closely defaulting debtor behavior resembles criminal behavior.
Any attempt to analogize between credit and criminal behavior must take into con-
sideration a number of interrelated factors. One is the degree of rationality involsed:
Obtaining credit is probably a fairly irrational and impulsive process during which the
debtor's concentration is on what he will do with the money rather than the need to
repay. Since the rationality of the conduct is by no means clear, the writings on "eco-
nomic" crimes would not seem particularly relevant. Moreover, the wrongful act itself
is not particularly severe in contrast with major crimes against person and property.
Thus, the ethics involved and the strength of ethical controls may be quite different.
Nevertheless, socialization may act quite strongly to encourage fulfillment of obligations.
Finally, the certainty of apprehension and enforcement is probably greater with credit
default than with almost all crimes.
5. For the suggestion that milder punishment will more effectively teach conduct con-
sistent with established norms, see Turner & Wright, Effects of Severity of Threat and
Perceived Availability on the Attractiveness of Objects, 2 J. PERsoNALrrY AND SOCIAL Psi-
CHOLOGY 128 (1965).
6. See, e.g., H. JACOB, DEBToRs IN CouRT 71, 110 (1969).
7. See D. CAPLovr-z, DEBTois IN DEFAULT 5-70, 5-71 (mimeographed prepublication ed.
1970, 1971). See also, H. JACOB, supra note 6, at 71.
8. It has been suggested, for example, that sanctions milder than used at present
against bad driving, when enforced by a point system, may have greater psychological
effect on poor driver behavior than harsh penalties. See Crainton, Driver Behavior and
Legal Sanctions: A Study of Deterrence, 67 Micit. L. REv. 421. 432-33 (1969). Most criminal
experts argue that it is the certainty of enforcement rather than the severity of the sanc-
tion which assures compliant behavior. See Andenaes, General Preventive, supra note 4,
at 960-64.
9. See D. CAPLovrrz, supra note 7, at 11-35, 11-36.
10. Presumably creditors who had better information about the credit burden of
their prospective customers could either refuse to give credit or could price discriminate
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is simply not clear that restrictions on coercive creditor remedies will
dilute either the moral suasion or deterrent effect on defaultors.
2. Will reform increase uncollectible defaulted debts?
The contention that restriction of creditor coercion will necessarily
increase the number of uncollectible debts is equally challehgeable. A
debt becomes uncollectible primarily due to the recalcitrance of the
debtor and the encumbrance of his assets. Reducing coercive remedies
may not, in fact, significantly alter either of these factors.
Legal coercion applied after default seems even less likely to reduce
debtor recalcitrance than when it is applied before. First, the motiva-
tion to repay after default may be considerably lower, because the
debtor has already endured whatever sense of shame or failure accom-
panies default. Moreover, debtors who have defaulted have usually done
so because they are already under considerable financial pressure; re-
paying after default would mean even greater hardship.
A reformed system of consumer credit, however, might still arouse
fear and psychological pressure sufficient to induce potential defaulters
to continue repayment at the same or nearly the same rate as under
more coercive remedies. Of particular importance is the fact that once
they have defaulted, debtors still know that they will be "apprehended"
and be under some further legal obligation.
It is doubtful, moreover, that creditors now gain very much from
coercive remedies which allow them to reach debtors' assets directly.
Coercive remedies may themselves encumber remaining assets and thus
make repayment all the more difficult. This is particularly true where
the debtor's major source of funds is future income. Coercive remedies
tend to eliminate this asset when, for example, employers annoyed with
having to garnish wages could respond by firing the debtor, or when
garnished employees lose their incentive to continue working. Re-
possession or execution are also often inefficient remedies because the
creditor rarely receives full repayment. Indeed, the expense of some
coercive measures may even exceed their return.1" The only satisfaction
against riskier customers. Creditors who did price discriminate should be rcquircd to
disclose to the debtor why a higher rate was charged so that the advantages of favorable
debtor behavior might then be made clearer, and the deterrent effect increased.
11. It is possible, however, that legal collection does produce a significant amount of
savings on defaulted debts even though it does not result in full collection. This Is par-
ticularly true in cases where the security given is easily resaleable and does not depreci-
ate rapidly, e.g., automobiles. Any amount collected would seem worthwhile as long as
it is larger than the cost required to collect it. Whether collection actually does produce
such an amount in a significant number of cases is completely unknown.
464
Vol. 82: 461, 1973
The Logic of Consumer Credit Reform
a creditor realizes in such situations, as Professor Leff has shown,1 2 is
spite.
3. Will reform mean more costly collection procedures?
While restriction of creditor coercion might well cause short-term
increases in collection costs, other consumer credit reforms, geared less
to the elimination of harsh remedies and more toward positive creditor
or debtor services, may actually produce savings which would more
than offset these increases. More efficient information systems could
reduce default rates by providing creditors with more complete data
on potential borrowers; therapeutic counseling might reduce the num-
ber of debtors who repeatedly find themselves in credit difficulty, by
advising potential borrowers and by helping defaulted debtors deal
with their debts. While such reforms would obviously not be cost free,
in the absence of clear empirical evidence, one cannot conclude that
reforms of this type would inevitably have a noticeable effect on the
price or availability of credit.
B. The Probability that the Creditor will Respond to Increased Costs
by Raising the Price or Reducing the Volume of Credit
Any actual increase in costs to the creditor that does result from re-
stricting coercion will produce price increases or volume reductions
only if the creditor's cost structure forces such a response. Several stud-
ies suggest a direct relationship between the overall price of credit and
the size of the creditor's provisions for bad debts.23 But such provisions
12. See Leff, Spite, supra note 3.
13. The literature is discussed in Shay, Factors Affecting Price, Volume and Credit
Risk in the Consumer Finance Industry, 25 J. FINANCE 503 (1970). Regression analyses
have demonstrated a strong correlation between the provision for bad debts and average
loans outstanding. See also G. GORDoN, J. WHEATLY, R. GAEDEKE, H. HALL & D. MC-NA .
TIE IMPACT OF A CoNsuMER Cnarr INmaas LMITATION LAw (1970); Comment, An Em-
pirical Study of the Arkansas Usury Law: "With Friends Like That ... ." 1968 U. ILL.
L.F. 544 (1968).
The most sophisticated studies trying to relate terms on which credit is extended to
default risk are limited to consideration of maturities and downpayments. See Fursten-
berg, Default Risk on FHA-Insured Home Mortgages as a Function of the Terms of
Financing: A Quantitative Analysis, 24 J. FINANCE 459 (1969).
The most that such studies suggest is that creditors' operating costs and the risk of
the loans granted are directly correlated. But these studies pertain to the classes of risk
which creditors will take on if they can charge certain prices. They are not relevant to
predicting how the behavior of a class of debtors who can be served within the existing
legal structure of rates will change if collection practices are restricted. The studies pur-
port to demonstrate creditor behavior, not consumer behavior.
Creditors may find that when they expend less money and effort collecting debts, their
operating costs remain the same (or even decrease), because any increase in the cost of
bad debts is compensated for by savings in collection costs. There is some indication
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may not be directly related to the cost of dealing with high-risk debtors.
At least one study has found no significant relationship between the
level of debtor risk and the price of the credit offered. 14 Thus, provi-
sions for bad debts may merely signal creditors' lack of efficiency or
vigor in collecting,' 5 shaped in part by the fact that creditors often
operate under imperfect competition and are rarely under strong pres-
sure to keep their expenses as low as possible. Faced with increased col-
lection or default costs and an elastic demand for credit, creditors may
well respond by streamlining their presently inefficient collection ef-
forts rather than by raising prices or curtailing loans; and, as has al-
ready been suggested, more efficient collection procedures need not
mean harsher collection tactics.
None of this is meant to suggest that an increase in the price or a
reduction in the volume of credit offered after the elimination of credi-
tor coercion is impossible. It is only to note that they are not necessary
and direct consequences, given the present state of empirical research.
A thorough appraisal of any specific reform should consider the proba-
bilities of such results but then move on to a second and perhaps more
important question: What would be the impact of reform on the effi-
cient use of all resources?
II. Consumer Credit Reform and Allocative Efficiency
One basis for evaluating consumer credit reform must be its effect
on the allocative efficiency of the credit market. Allocative efficiency
is achieved when the quantity of credit purchased maximizes social
gains from credit resources relative to potential gains from all other
resources. Thus, under perfect allocative efficiency, debtors would pur-
chase credit up to and not beyond that point where the last dollar spent
on credit produces more net benefits to society than if it were spent
elsewhere. This perfectly allocated condition could obtain if all the
social costs and benefits generated by a credit transaction were reflected
in the credit contract and if all imperfections were eliminated from the
that when creditors use a particular remedy a great deal, the return for each use of
the remedy declines quite drastically after a certain point. See, e.g., D. CAPLOVITZ, supra
note 7, at 12-69.
14. See Goudzwaard, Rate Ceilings, Loan Turndowns and Credit Opportunity, 6 NV.
EcoN. J. 404 (1968); Goudzwaard, Consumer Credit Charges and Credit Availability, 85
S. EcoN. J. 214 (1969).
15. See Goudzwaard, The Price-Volume Structure of the Consumer Credit Industry:
A Discussion, 25 J. FINANCE 526 (1970).
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credit market.16 Although the fulfillment of these conditions may be
difficult,17 entailing huge administrative costs,' 8 the consumer credit
market could be made more allocatively efficient than it now is, by
taking measures to minimize market imperfections and bring as many
credit-generated costs and benefits as possible to bear on the credit con-
tract. Another way to make the credit market more allocatively effi-
cient would be to impose direct controls after deciding on an optimal
amount of credit by careful analysis of all relevant costs and benefits
and then allocating credit accordingly.
Of course any tampering with the present credit market would in-
volve probabilities and uncertainties..The risk that debtors, creditors,
or the market will behave in unforeseen ways would have to be re-
flected in the decision to initiate a specific reform. Moreover, such
calculations must also account for the expense of adopting and admin-
istering a reformed system: The administrative costs of imposing a per-
fectly allocated system may, in reality, be prohibitive.
Opponents of reform may argue that any tampering with consumer
sovereignty would result in less allocative efficiency: Reforms which
eliminate coercive remedies or supply services such as screening or
therapy should not be imposed (so the argument might run) because
if debtors or creditors wanted such reform they would purchase it. But
if prospective debtors wish to purchase cheaper credit along with the
chance of default and coercive creditor tactics, they should be allowed
to do so. The opponents of reform may ask: Why run the high risk of
misallocation by imposing reform when we already know what credi-
tors and debtors want because we see them bargain for it in the market-
place?
But such arguments may fail to see the serious imperfections in the
credit market which prevent the freely bargained supply of credit from
being allocatively efficient. Such imperfections may lead to an over-
supply or undersupply of credit regardless of the bargain between cred-
itors and debtors. At times the effects may cancel each other out, but
such a fortuitous result would be purely accidental.
16. Even this model of perfect allocation has built in biases representing value judg-
ments about the desirability of allocative efficiency. See, e.g., R. KuV.ONE, NICeo-Eco-
NOMIC THEORY OF THE MARKET MECHANISM 363 (1968).
17. One additional complication occurs to the extent that various benefits and costs
do not occur at once but only in the future. They must thus be reduced to present
value. Also, labelling the effects "benefits" or "costs" is basically arbitrary, both be-
cause differing value judgments will suggest different categorization and because it is
frequently unknown whether the actual magnitude of some of the effects will be posi-
tive or negative.
18. See p. 476 infra.
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A. Possible Imperfections in the Current Credit Market
1. Imperfections Leading to Undersupply
Several imperfections exist in the credit market which may result in
too little credit being purchased. These include:
Concentration in the credit industry. Instead of a highly competitive
credit market in which creditors bid against each other to attract debt-
ors, the credit market exhibits a large number of monopolistic charac-
teristics,' 9 at least at the local level. Typically, a small number of credi-
tors serve low-income areas and many low-income buyers do not have
the transportation or information necessary to shop intelligently. De-
pending on the degree of monopoly and elasticity of demand for credit,
creditors may raise prices to maximize their own profits, causing debt-
ors to purchase a smaller quantity of credit than they would if the price
reflected its real cost. Reform aimed at this imperfection might include
an increase in debtor information, subsidies to debtor mobility, price
ceilings on credit sales, or the elimination of artificial barriers to com-
petition arising from present licensing laws.
Unavailable debtor services. Another imperfection contributing to
undersupply is the lack of certain services for debtors which, if sup-
plied, would make credit far more attractive. If, for example, at the
time of entering the credit transaction debtors could purchase an in-
surance policy entitling them to assistance in the event of default, and
if such assistance reduced the cost of future anguish by a greater
amount than it increased costs, rational debtors would purchase more
credit. Of course, if the service caused creditor costs to increase by an
amount equal to or greater than the debtor's net gain (perhaps because
debtors who no longer feared future anguish would not feel as great
an incentive to repay) the competitive price of credit would increase to
wipe out any debtor gain, and there would be no overall increase in the
amount of credit purchased.
The free market has probably not exploited such potential increases
in allocative efficiency and supplied such debtor services due to debtor
short-sightedness and a lack of creditor ability to exploit economies of
scale. To encourage debtors to demand such reforms, they could be
supplied with information about the likelihood of future hardship and
19. See Smith, Description of Nine-Company Consumer Finance Sample and of Adjust-
ments in Data in THE CONSUMER FINANCE INDUSRY 163, 164 (J. Chapman, R. Shay cds.
1967). "[N]ine [consumer finance] companies held $3.1 billion in consumer receivables
at the end of 1964 and accounted for 66 per cent of the loans held by all consumer
finance companies and 50 per cent of the receivables of all personal finance companies."
Vol. 82: 461, 197"3
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the advantages of the debtor service. Reform might also subsidize credi-
tors until economies of scale were reached.
Unavailable creditor services. A third imperfection in the credit mar-
ket occurs to the extent that creditors do not differentiate between high-
risk and low-risk debtors. Misallocations result when low-risk debtors
purchase too little credit because credit is offered at too high a price
relative to the risk that they will default, and high-risk debtors are
purchasing too much credit at too low a price. If better information
were available, creditors could price discriminate between such debt-
ors. Better discrimination would enable them to reduce uncollectible
debts and costly collection practices and, in a competitive market, offer
a greater quantity of credit at lower prices. The reason that such serv-
ices are not now available may have to do with legal difficulties block-
ing creditor cooperation or problems in achieving economies of scale.
To the extent that the cost of such services when fully developed would
be less than the cost savings they produced, reform which subsidizes or
develops such services should increase allocative efficiency.
Macro-economic benefits. A final imperfection causing an under-
supply of credit occurs to the extent that credit produces benefits other
than those accruing to the purchaser. If such external benefits of credit
were included in the credit transaction, more credit would be pur-
chased. For example, consumer credit may well promote economic
growth by permitting the anticipation of purchases and shifting de-
mand toward durable goods industries which have greater potential
for expansion.20 Of course, consumers must repay their loans with in-
20. For a review of the literature concerning the relationship between consumer credit
and long-term growth, see Jones, Theories of Consumer Instalment Credit in Relation
to Economic Stability, in 1 UNrrED STAT-S BD. OF GovmaxoRs oF Tim FED. Rrs. Sys.. Cox-
suMiER ISTALMEiN&T CRMrr pt. I, 235 (1957) [hereinafter cited as CowsumR IsrAxl-
CEDrr].
The ingenuity of a number of economists has been taxed in trying to explain how
economic growth is encouraged by consumer credit. The most common explanations in-
clude the following: 1) Consumer credit produces a faster growing demand than other-
wise, which through multiplier and accelerator effects encourages greater business and
consumer spending. 2) Consumer credit acts automatically to temper the fluctuations of
the business cycle. The result is more stable and lasting growth, and less use of fiscal or
monetary manipulation. 3) Consumer credit encourages durables purchases and so shifts
consumer demand into a sector of the economy which is most prone to technological
innovation. 4) Sales resistance is reduced causing greater consumer spending (and less
saving). See Taylor, Instalment Credit and Aggregate Demand in 1 CoNsuMER IsrmALMr
CREDrr pt. I, 164, 176-77 (1957). 5) Consumer credit provides a spending outlet for sav-
ings that would otherwise remain as stagnant bank reserves. 6) In relation to the busi-
ness cycle, consumer credit encourages a speedy up-turn. Therefore the expanding part of
the business cycle is of longer duration than otherwise. 7) Because of the %-ay consumer
credit affects consumer behavior, the bottoms of cycical fluctuations arc not as low as
they otherwise would be. 8) Because consumer credit permits consumers to buy major
durables, it gives the work force greater incentives, hence increasing both reliability and
productivity. See Miller, Consumer Credit and Economic Growth, in I Co.suMER INsTAL-
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terest, thereby reducing later expenditures by a proportionate amount.
But insofar as credit adds to the normal growth in demand, capital
accumulation and technical innovation occur earlier, resulting in a
more advanced economy with higher productivity.
Economic stability may be another macro-economic benefit of credit.
It is often assumed that credit spurs the economy at the beginning of
an upswing by allowing consumers to anticipate spending power. It is
said to moderate downturns by providing consumers with the means of
maintaining prior levels of consumption, thereby dampening the cycli-
cal plunge.21 Unfortunately, studies to date fail to substantiate the as-
sertion that the consumer credit system has such a favorable impact
on growth and stability. If credit is now undersupplied to high-risk,
low-income debtors, there is little evidence that such an undersupply
significantly affects overall demand.22 Thus, these possible external
benefits to the economy generated by credit would not seem signifi-
cant enough to warrant the risks and costs of reform.
2. Imperfections Leading to Oversupply
Market imperfections causing excessive use of credit occur to the
extent that credit use generates costs which are greater than its actual
price. If such external costs could be brought to bear on the credit
transaction, the price of credit would be higher and less would be pur-
chased. The most important of these costs include:
MENT CREDIT pt. II, 169, 200 (1957). 9) Consumer credit shifts overall demand to durables
which means that consumers then own a greater proportion of capital goods than other-
wise. See Abramovitz, Comment, 1 CONSUMER INSTALMENT CREDIT pt. II, 246 et seq. (1957).
See also Bouveng, Consumer Credit, Some Long Term Economic Aspects, 68 SwEDls|I J.
ECON. 234 (1966).
21. See J. Vostermans, in I CONSUMER INSTALMENT CREDIT, supra note 20, pt. I at 15
(1957).
22. Cf. McCracken, J. Mao & C. Fricke, Study of Consumer Preferences in 3 CoNsumER
INSTALMENT CREDIT, supra note 20, pt. II at 72 (1957). Even if all credit now extended to
persons with incomes of less than $5,000 were curtailed, only 1.35% of the total dollar
volume of consumer credit would be lost. If that entire decrease affected durable goods
sales, only 1.81% of such sales would be eliminated-certainly an insignificant threat
to the economy. Moreover, since low-income consumers often pay two or three times the
value of a good purchased on credit, an undersupply of credit will have but a slilght
impact on overall demand. Moreover, a great deal of low-income borrowing invo ves
refinancing or second-hand purchases, both of which have only the remotest effect on
demand. Finally capital freed by such an undersupply in credit volume is undoubtedly
diverted into other sectors of the economy, thereby spurring growth in those new sectors.
These percentages are derived by combining the percentage of families with instalment
debt in income groups below $5,000 and the percentage of total families in the United
States which are in these income groups. The combined percentage is then multtplied
by the total number of families in the United States to get a figure representing the
number of families in the United States in those income groups who have instalment debt.
The figure is then multiplied by the median debt of the income groups to get the total
dollar amount of credit outstanding for those earning below $5,000. Credit outstanding
for that income group is then divided by the total outstanding to get the percentage
of total outstanding which represents loans to those earning below $5,000.
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Public subsidization of the regzlatoty system. Society as a whole now
finances the apparatus which regulates the credit market-the judges,
administrators, legal service lawyers, enforcement officials, and clerical
employees. The payment of such expenses is a clear subsidization of
the credit market.23
Lost productivity. Another external cost to society consists of work
time lost by debtors due to court appearances, meetings with creditors,
and general psychological stress.2 4 Many debtors may be forced to take
jobs not commensurate with their skills or hazardous to their health in
order to cope with economic crisis. Others may lose their jobs and
spend days or months finding another.25 Entire families may be af-
fected: For example, the debtors' children may terminate their educa-
tion in order to take low-skill jobs, thereby missing vocational oppor-
tunities and reducing the economy's productivity.
Loss of respect for government. Those who are subjected to coercive
collection tactics employed by the present system, as some empirical
studies show,2 6 may emerge from the process with much less respect
for the courts and legal system. Such attitudes may make it more diffi-
cult to maintain an ordered society, particularly when all the entire
debtor's family is affected.
Hardship for debtor and family. In addition to these costs to society
in general, substantial burdens accrue to the debtors themselves-bur-
dens which are not reflected in the price of credit. The debtor must
endure the hardship of repaying debts when, as a result, his personal
standard of living is reduced and his financial flexibility limited. The
23. That most creditor actions filed go to default judgment strongly suggests that
creditor use of regulatory apparatus is much greater than debtor use. See D. C,,,Lovrr,
supra note 7, at 11-66; U.C.LA. Project, supra note 3, at 891.
See generally INSTrrIUTE OF JUDICIAL ADM., STATE & LOCAL FINANCING OF TIlE COtrS
(tentative ed. 1969); U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNME%"TAL RELATIONS. STATE-
LOCAL RELATIONS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTE-NI (1971).
24. See D. CAPLOVrrz, supra note 7, at 14-7 to 14-8.
25. See, e.g., D. CAPLOVITZ, supra note 7, 14-6 to 14-13; H. JACOB, supra note 6. at 104.
Caplovitz found that eight per cent of his sample of debtors who worked in states with
wage garnishment lost their jobs. When the focus was narrowed to those debtors whose
wages were garnished, nineteen per cent lost their jobs. Seven per cent of Jacob's sample
of garnished debtors reported being fired, while seventeen per cent recalled being warned
that additional garnishments might jeopardize their jobs.
26. See H. JACOB, supra note 6, at 117-24. In Jacob's study. forty per cent of the
garnishees studied were either ambivalent or reported that the system treated them
unfairly. Eleven per cent of the bankrupts had the same reaction. Id. at 117. Of
course, insofar as the debtor's disaffection with the judicial process results from more
intimate knowledge rather than unfair treatment, it would appear impossible to design
reform which would reduce disaffection unless it also reduced debtor contact with the
system. It has been hypothesized that consumer credit difficulty was a causal factor in
the attitudes which led to the riots of 1966 and 1967. See U.S. NATIONAL ADvISORY CoMn-
MISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT 139-40 (1968); Note, Consumer Legislation and the
Poor, 76 YALE L.J. 745, 746 (1967). Yet there is no clear evidence that a real causal con-
nection existed.
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debtor may suffer the frustration of being unable to obtain a remedy
for faulty goods because the credit contract does not permit him to
withhold the balance of the purchase price from the creditor-assignee
of the seller.2 7 He may also suffer from psychological pressure inherent
in devices such as repossession, deficiency judgments, garnishment, and
other execution processes. Simultaneously, he may face the social cen-
sure and personal guilt associated with the failure to meet his obliga-
tions. A number of recent studies substantiate the magnitude of
anguish, shame, and suffering associated with default and the present
coercive remedies. Nearly forty-five per cent of Caplovitz's study' re-
ported physical ailments assertedly related to the pressures of default 2
Other defaulters have reported increased marital difficulty, reduced
expenditures on food and other living expenses, and substantial worry
over loss of employment.2 Many of these costs may undergo a kind of
multiplier effect as the debtor's suffering affects his entire family.80
The current system cannot allocate credit efficiently if debtors who
enter the credit transaction fail to appreciate the probability of de-
fault occurring and the consequences following for themselves and
their families. If the debtor underestimates either the probability of
default or the amount of hardship resulting therefrom he will demand
more credit than his informed preferences would dictate. If most debt-
ors underestimate these risks, the demand for credit will be inflated.
3. Reform Techniques for Reducing Oversupply
Reform could aim at eliminating such external costs, e.g., by pro-
hibiting the coercive creditor practices which cause them, or at bring-
27. Of course it should be noted that inroads have been made into the protected
status of creditor-assignees in the consumer credit field. See, e.g., Fairfield Credit Corp.
v. Donnelly, 158 Conn. 543, 264 A.2d 547 (1969) (waiver of defense clause in retail sales
installment contract held void as against public policy); Norman v. World Wide Distribu-
tor's Inc., 202 Pa. Super. 53, 195 A.2d 115 (1963) (holder in due course protection unavail-
able to assignee put on inquiry as to assignor's fraudulent selling practices). Recently It
has been recognized that related problems exist in the credit card and "loan related to
sale" field. See generally Comment, Waiver of Defense Clauses in Three Party Consumer
Credit Card Transactions, 11 B.C. IND. & Coss. L. REv. 991 (1970). For a proposed pro-
vision aimed at the "loan related to sale" problem, see NATIONAL CONSUarMR Aar § 2.407
(First Final Draft, 1970).
28. See D. CAPLoviTz, supra note 7, at 14-13, 14-20.
29. See H. JAcoB, supra note 6, at 114. These social costs may be quite high when the
population is viewed as a whole. Professor Spanogle suggests that between 400,000 to
700,000 families per year have debt trouble. See Spanogle, The Consumer in Trouble in
the United States, in ASPECTS OF COMPARATIVE COMMERCIAL LAw 269 U. Ziegel & W. Foster
eds. 1969). Caplovitz suggests (by extrapolating from four American cities) that three
million defaulters are sued yearly. See D. CAPLOVITZ, supra note 12, at 14-8. Neither
Spanogle nor Caplovitz indicates clearly how he derived his totals.
30. See D. CAPLOVITZ, supra note 7, at 14-20 to 14-22. Contra, H. JACOB, supra note 6,
at 105. See also Herrmann, Families in Bankruptcy-A Survey of Recent Studies, 28 J.
MARRIAGE & FAMILY 324 (1966); Matsen, Profile of the Problem User of Credit-The Band.
rupt, in NATIONAL WORKSHOP ON CONSUMER CREDIT IN FAMILY FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT,
CONSUMER CREDIT IN FAMILY FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 73 (1967).
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ing the costs to bear in the credit transaction. Prohibition risks elimi-
nating benefits that may, in some cases, exceed the costs which are
eliminated. Further, some of these costs are so difficult to quantify or
so remote that an error in estimating them may wipe out any prospec-
tive gain. Those costs for which the risk of such error is substantial
should therefore not be internalized. It would seem that reform could
most easily aim at internalizing the costs falling upon the debtor and
his family.
Reform could respond to the external costs falling upon the debtor
and his family in three distinct ways: By so improving debtor foresight
of the risks and consequences of default that these consequences would
no longer be "external" to the credit bargain; by prohibiting the
causes of the costs; and by internalizing the costs through a kind of
corrective tax levy.
a. Debtor education
Debtors might be forced to recognize the probability of default oc-
curring and the consequences following default through a program of
education and counseling. If the debtor could be compelled to feel the
depth of hardship associated with default, his demand for credit would
reflect more accurately his true preferences. His demand for credit
would be further enlightened if he could estimate more accurately his
particular level of risk. If debtor demand for credit then fell, the com-
petitive creditor would have a choice: either maintain coercive reme-
dies and sell credit at the new .lower price, or eliminate coercion and
sell at a higher price reflecting the increased creditor costs resulting
from such elimination. If the cost to the creditor of eliminating reme-
dies is higher than the cost to the informed debtor of having them
employed, the creditor will be content to sell credit with coercion at
the lower price; if not, the creditor will eliminate the devices. The
creditor's choice would be, in any case, an allocatively efficient one.
Of course, an education program sufficiently graphic to alter con-
sumer behavior probably would be extraordinarily difficult to con-
struct. Counseling in this area has rarely proven effective because of
the strong consumer biases in favor of immediate gratification and an
unwillingness to take full account of future hardship and risk.31 For
31. The whole thrust of manipulative and want-stimulaing advertising is tomard
immediate gratification. While the advertising establishment has done an excellent job
of proclaiming the value of present consumption, it has said very little about the value
of later consumption and present saving. Even if information about the benefits of sav-
ing as against the costs of credit use could be provided, information about the actual
emotional state (level of satisfaction) that will occur in the future cannot be provided.
The inability of consumers to accurately balance future costs against present and
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such an education program to be successful, it would have to affect the
deepest of character traits; even if that were possible, the costs of doing
so would probably exceed any concomitant gains in allocative effi-
ciency.
b. Prohibition of certain creditor remedies
If coercive creditor techniques were simply abolished there would
obviously be no need to internalize their harmful effects. But any such
elimination of creditor remedies would fail to produce allocative effi-
ciency if creditor costs were thereby increased more than the harm
to debtors was decreased. If this occurred, the competitive price of
credit would rise above the price sufficient to internalize the hardships
of coercive remedies. Such a situation should be unlikely, however, as
the value of coercive remedies to creditors is generally low while the
costs to debtors are high. Moreover, creditors deprived of coercive reme-
dies would have more incentive to improve their own information sys-
tems, thus increasing their capacity to assess the riskiness of individual
debtors and reducing another market imperfection.3 2 They would also
have more incentive to control the sales practices and quality of items
bought with credit. 33 Instead of insisting on payment from debtors who
indicate strong dissatisfaction with purchased items, creditors would be
more likely to throw the credit contract back to the seller under a re-
purchase agreement. 34
It should be noted, however, that abolition of creditor remedies may
have costly side effects. The concomitant price increase might trigger,
for example, an underworld loan shark market which employed genu-
inely abusive, self-help remedies. And abolition may not ameliorate
entirely the anguish, shame and loss of self-respect which commonly
result from default. In order to eliminate such guilt, reform might
have to alter the definition of default, e.g., by making liable only
those whose failure to pay resulted from negligence or bad faith 3E
future benefits has been insisted on by some writers and challenged by others. Cornpare
Jukerji, Two Papers on Time in Economics, 7 ARTHA VIJNANA 296 (1965) and Danilc lan,
The Theory of Consumers' Credit, 19 AM. ECON. REV. 393, 397 (1929), with W. MoPS, CON-
SUMERS CREDIT THEORIES 21, 23 (1944). Professor Mors surveys the disputants prior to
1944. See id. at 28.
32. See p. 463 supra.
33. See Littlefield, Preserving Consumer Defenses: Plugging the Loophole in the New
UCCC, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 272, 280-86 (1969).
34. See Comment, A Case Study of the Impact of Consumer Legislation: The Elini.
nation of Negotiability and the Cooling-Off Period, 78 YALE L.J. 618, 640 (1969). The
Yale study bases this statement on a survey of eleven banks engaged in financing home
solicitation sales after 1967. For strong criticism of the methodology of the Yale study,
see Shuchman, Empirical Studies in Commercial Law, 23 1. LE(. ED. 181, 183-84 (1971).
35. The proof problems caused by providing debtors with the defense that they have
not negligently or wilfully caused the default would be substantial. When, for example,
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One might also consider programs designed to aid the debtor and his
family-to teach them to marshal their assets and bargain with their
creditors, while at the same time adjusting them to the idea that they
were overcommitted.30 Such a program, perhaps financed by the credi-
tors much as is their fire insurance, could combine, as in Great
Britain,37 legal and social aid in one agency. Creditor financing would
of course have allocative effects of its own.
c. Internalization through specific levies
Government might intervene to internalize the costs of creditor
remedies by imposing a direct charge, equal to the estimated external
costs, on their use. The charge might be imposed on any credit con-
tract which provided for coercive remedies, or it might be imposed
upon the actual use of such remedies. It would promote allocative effi-
ciency to the extent that it compelled creditors to avoid the use of
coercive remedies whenever the social cost of using them exceeded
the benefits. Thus, the competitive price of credit would reflect either
the social cost of the coercive remedy or the cost to the creditor of
foresaking it, whichever was lower.
Two objections can be raised against such a proposal. It might be
contended first that the external costs would be impossible for the
government to quantify and translate into selective charges. In response,
it may be argued that the calculation would be possible within a cer-
tain acceptable margin of error.
Secondly, one might object that it seems unjust and irrational for
debtors to end up paying for charges which reflect the likely hardships
they will endure from coercive remedies. That is, while the user charge
may produce allocative efficiency, its distributive impact would be
regressive. This objection might be met if the proceeds of the charges
were used to subsidize debtors who incurred the hardships of default.
While such subsidies might have a detrimental impact on allocative
efficiency to the extent debtors relied on them, the risk seems rather
small in light of the distributive equities involved.
has a debtor been negligent? Either the matter could be left to the courts for definition
or clear indicia of non-negligent conduct would be written into the reform. Thus a de-
fense could be that the debtor had lost his source of income through lay.off, firing, or
illness. See Kripke, Credit Oriented, supra note 2, at 477 for a less drastic proposal.
36. Debt counseling agencies best approach this model. See M. HALL. SUMMARY RE-
PORT ON FAMILY CREDIT COUNSELLING-A.N EMERGING CO.M.UNm" SERvicE (1968). Since a
number of these agencies are funded in part by local creditors. however, they tend not
to indicate to the debtor that he is simply unable to repay his debts.
37. See Lythe, Looking Around?, 16 CASE CONFERENCE 39 (1969).
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B. Will Reform Increase Administrative Costs?
The impact of reform on governmental expenditures would vary
tremendously, with the reform package chosen. A package that reduced
the risk of underestimating or overestimating the externalities of the
present system might entail huge administrative expenditures, while
a package that more or less ignored the risk of misallocations might
actually involve less administrative expense than the present system.
For example, attempts to achieve the optimal allocation of credit re-
sources through economic analysis and to limit by government regu-
lation credit resources to that prescribed allocation, might be less costly
than an attempt to achieve that allocation by rebuilding the market.
Although the costs of such analysis and direct regulation would un-
doubtedly be large, the costs of rebuilding the market could be even
larger. Yet, that market, once rebuilt, might be capable of automati-
cally producing a better allocation of resources than one imposed by
the government.
If there is a trade-off between risk of misallocation and administra-
tive expense, one goal of reform should be to find the best mix be-
tween the two. It might be, for example, that if defaulting debtors were
liable only for negligent default, creditors would be less likely to use
the court system, and judicial expenses would thereby decrease. For
the trade-off to work, however, this decrease would have to offset the
additional expense of the new means of handling non-negligent de-
faults.38
Of course, even if the costs of administering reform were substantial,
those costs might well produce further savings elsewhere in the credit
system. For example, if the government were to provide the service of
"skip-tracing" interstate debtors, its administrative cost might be less
than the cost of an analogous service carried on by creditors.
In light of these uncertainties and risks, reform in consumer credit
should be instituted wherever possible as an experiment to be adjusted
periodically, rather than a permanent panacea. Experimenting through
the legislative process may, of course, be difficult, as a government
benefit once conferred is often difficult politically to retract. But the
prospect of achieving substantial credit reform without major adminis-
trative expense appears to justify some experimentation. Reforms in-
volving even substantial regulatory cost might also be attempted, if the
38. Of course, any savings would depend upon how debtors and creditors reacted to
the reforms. While limitations upon creditor remedies might reduce creditor reliance
upon the court, they might at the same time encourage debtors to defend more often.
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potential gains in allocative efficiency appeared great enough to sup-
port the risk. Still, there are likely to be some technical difficulties in
measuring external costs, and political problems in convincing legis-
latures to terminate unsuccessful reform experiments.
III. Consumer Credit Reform and Wealth Distribution
Another basis for evaluating consumer credit reform would be its
effect on the distribution of wealth. Such a concern is obviously rele-
vant to credit reform; indeed the ostensible motive behind many re-
form proposals is to reduce the suffering and injustice visited on those
who cannot pay their exorbitant debts. Moreover, there are few who
would vent their disapproval of the present system by denying high-
risk borrowers the opportunity to borrow. Thus, the question inevi-
tably arises: If reform ends the credit of the poor, high-risk debtor, is
he really helped?
The argument that consumer credit reform will deny low-income
consumers credit and thereby worsen their plight begins with the asser-
tion, discussed above,39 that reform will increase creditor costs, pro-
ducing a credit price increase or volume reduction. But even if such
events occur, it may not follow that this loss of credit would markedly
affect the distribution of wealth.
Such a loss will not affect individual purchasing power.40 Although
credit does enable the low-income consumer to purchase goods and
services without recourse to savings or current income, thereby creating
a semblance of increased purchasing power in the short run, his net
purchasing power in the long run will be less than that of a consumer
who does not borrow: The credit consumer must eventually pay for
his credit, and these interest payments will reduce his subsequent pur-
chasing power.
Short term increases in purchasing power may, however, produce
advantages which the low-income consumer would otherwise be de-
nied. First, the credit purchase of certain durable goods may provide
the consumer with long-term economies (for example, the use of a
39. See p. 462 supra.
40. See, e.g., Ziegel & Olley, Foreword, to CoNstll.t CRDrr IN CANADA iii (J. Ziegel
& R. Olley eds. 1966) [hereinafter cited as CAAD.,,]. Professor Kripke urges that con-
sumer credit should not be restricted because to do so would deny consumer goods to
"law-abiding members of the dispossessed, who get the possessions they want from credit
purchases." Kripke, Credit Oriented, supra note 2, at 479.
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private washing machine instead of public laundry).41 Second, credit
purchase before sufficient savings have been accumulated could pro-
vide the consumer with a hedge against inflation which might other-
wise sap the value of such savings. 42 Third, credit may provide the con-
sumer lacking discipline to save for durables with an attractive forced-
savings device.4 3 Fourth, it may give consumers the psychic benefit of
being able to consume above their normal income level. 44 Fifth, it may
prove a means for withstanding temporary economic adversities such
as job loss or illness. 45 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, credit
purchases made before the accumulation of savings often allow younger
people to enjoy goods they will ultimately be able to afford, by allow-
ing them to redistribute their lifetime earnings to best fit their needs. 40
Simultaneously, a denial of credit may cause specific hardships. The
very process of being refused credit may produce embarrassment and
humiliation. The stigma of having been judged unworthy of credit is
similar to the defaulter's sense of guilt,47 though the poor credit risk
will probably cease seeking credit and accept his no-credit status. How-
ever, such acceptance may take the form of turning to criminal sources
for credit. 48 As noted above, in such a situation both the real and hid-
41. See Neufield, The Economic Significance of Consumer Credit in CANADA, supra
note 40, at 5, 9. Professor Neufield here relies on a study which found that substantial
savings resulted from the use of a television over other outside entertainment. Yet if the
consumer is unwise, he may actually spend more for the good than for the particular
service. See also Mors, Commentary, in CANADA, supra note 40, at 19, 22 n.10. It would
seem likely that consumer credit is used to purchase luxuries-that is, a good which
represents a stream of services more expensive than what the consumer already has.
42. The significance of this benefit should not be overestimated. As long as in-
flation remains at a fairly predictable rate, both credit prices and interest paid by savings
institutions will reflect that rate. Thus this benefit will be realized only in extreme, run-
away inflation, which this country has not experienced in this century.
43. Economic studies do not suggest that consumer credit results in increased liquidity.
Advertisements from finance companies, however, often suggest that consumer credit
use results in "savings." Professor Neufield notes that the increased disposable income
may actually be saved, but is careful to insist that there is no certainty that this will
occur. Since Neufield also finds that consumer saving is relatively unaffected by the level
of consumer credit use, it may be equally likely that the increase in disposable income
will instead be spent on consumption. See Neufield, supra note 41.
44. Of course, this advantage is essentially short term. Where families try to use It for
the long term, disaster results. Moreover, its value would seem less clear as welfare pro-
grams improve. See also Fortin, The Social Meaning and Implications of Consumer Credit,
in CANADA, supra note 40, at 30. Professor Fortin describes a class of borrowers who
chronically use credit to increase what they consider to be an inadequate income. At
a certain point, repayments can no longer be refinanced, and massive default occurs.
45. See, e.g., Neufield, supra note 41, at 10.
46. See Thurow, The Optimum Lifetime Distribution of Consumption Expenditures,
59 Ams. ECON. REV. 324 (1969). See also IV. Moas, CONSUIER-CREDIT TisEORIEs 21 (1941).
47. See p. 472 supra.
48. Professor Kripke (and others) suggest that one effect of reform may be to drive
debtors to borrowing from loan sharks. See Kripke, Gesture, supra note 2, at 54. The argu-
ment assumes that 1) the effect of reform would be to increase creditor costs and 2) that
usury ceilings would prevent the creditor from passing on those costs to debtors in the
form of increased prices. Thus, reputable creditors would leave the low-income market
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den external costs of credit may increase to rather gruesome propor-
tions. Of course, the risk and high prices associated with such borrow-
ing should discourage most debtors from pursuing this alternative
under normal conditions. And even if debtors did desire such loans,
a simple way of urging them back into the legitimate market would
be to eliminate usury ceilings and allow prices to increase dramatically
with risk.49
In sum, credit may provide flexibility, ease, and economy-advan-
tages which bear a direct relationship to the willingness of debtors to
pay the price of credit. Thus, denying credit to high-risk debtors may
cause them some frustration, although they may gain both by not pay-
ing interest charges and by avoiding the hardships associated with de-
fault. These latter gains may, in fact, outweigh the disadvantages from
the absence of credit. Indeed, reform may be viewed as providing a
benefit to everyone who uses credit by reducing the risk of serious hard-
ship associated with default. In this way, price increases or volume
reductions caused by reform may be seen as "payments" for compulsory
insurance against misfortune.
How well these increases or reductions match the risk depends, of
course, on how broadly the risk category is defined. If, in order to
guard against losses in a reformed system, creditors respond by charg-
ing all their customers the same higher price or reducing the amount
of credit available to all regardless of risk, the low-risk (and more
wealthy) borrowers will be subsidizing the insurance of the high-risk
(and poorer) ones. There will thus be a wealth transfer from rich to
poor. But if, on the other hand, creditors discriminate according to
risk, there will be less of this transfer effect. Of course, the actual dis-
tribution is likely to be far more complicated. If the credit market is
segmented between low-risk, wealthy debtors borrowing from banks,
and higher-risk, poor debtors borrowing from loan companies, the
banks may not respond to reforms at all, while the loan companies
would probably increase their prices substantially. If this happened,
wealth would be redistributed to some degree from low-income bor-
rowers who repaid their debts to those who did not. Meanwhile, the
highest risk debtors would probably be denied loans altogether. In any
and the low-income debtor would be forced to turn to illegal lenders. Here, there is little
assurance that illegal lenders carefully relate their prices to their costs, and their collection
tactics may include maiming and murder. 113 CONG. REC. 24460, 24461 (1967) (Study of
Organized Crime and the Urban Poor, remarks by Representative McDade).
49. The simple answer to the problem of loan sharks is that reform should include
provisions sufficient to keep reputable lenders in the low-income market. Either usury
rates should be increased, subsidies provided, or other reforms designed so that creditor
costs would not seriously increase.
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case, regardless of how segmented the credit market, poor debtors
would not necessarily find themselves worse off; some, in fact, might
be better off.
To the extent that reform did not increase creditor expenses, it
would have very little wealth transfer impact on creditors. Even if it
does raise operating costs, creditors might pass a part of the costs on to
debtors unless, as suggested above,G0 demand for credit is highly elastic
and at the same time creditors already enjoy monopoly profits. Yet,
even under these conditions, little wealth transfer is likely to result
because creditors would, in the long term, withdraw their investments
from credit markets and reinvest in other sectors of the economy. Thus
the only possible transfer of wealth away from the creditor would occur
if the profit margin in the credit industry were substantially higher
than in other investment opportunities. Yet studies indicate the con-
trary.5 1
There is thus no certainty whatever that the wealth distribution im-
pact of consumer credit reform would be regressive. If a given con.
sumer credit reform did not increase creditor expenses, little or no re-
distribution would occur, though debtors as a group might be better
off than they were before reform. If, instead, reform did increase credi-
tor costs and the demand for credit were relatively inelastic, creditors
would be likely to pass the increased costs along to the debtors; a
wealth transfer might then occur from lower-risk debtors to higher-risk
debtors who pay the same price for credit. If reform increased creditor
costs and the demand for credit were relatively elastic, creditors might
lose some wealth in reducing the volume of credit offered and convert-
ing their investments to other sectors of the economy; debtors who
under these circumstances refrained from paying the higher price of
credit might also lose certain advantages associated with credit, but
would gain by avoiding the risk of default.
IV. Value Choices
An evaluation of various consumer credit reforms can go only so far.
There will be some critics who insist that any benefits from refornr
50. See p. 466 supra.
51. The major study of the rate of return for consumer finance companies finds it
average return of 12.2% net profits to equity funds. See Smith, Recent Trends in thI
Financial Position of Nine Major Consumer Finance Companies In Tim CoNssntt F
NANCE INDusmY 49 (J. Chapman & R. Shay eds. 1967). Though this Is somewhat greati
than other rates of return, the lower risk and greater ease of administration for buginc
loans may make the investment opportunities in the general business market mo
attractive to the average lender.
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are not as significant as the moral effrontery of allowing defaulting
debtors to avoid their just deserts. Other critics will claim that debtors
should be free to choose the high-risk of future suffering if that is what
they want. Still others may argue that if we are interested in increasing
allocative efficiency or redistributing wealth, there are far easier and
more efficient ways of doing so than by becoming embroiled in the
consumer credit market.
To admit the validity of such criticisms is merely to acknowledge
that value choices underlie all policy decisions, and that argument
must, after a certain point, give way to the most basic value differences.
Yet it should be noted that some reforms may challenge basic values
less than others. Reforms which are not likely to increase creditor costs
present few difficulties for critics who are concerned about freedom of
choice or the means of redistributing wealth, since such reform may
be relatively inexpensive. The abolition of holder-in-due-course de-
vices, restriction of wage garnishment, and the removal of the "blanket"
clauses which give the creditor an interest in virtually all the debtor's
household goods appear to fall in this class.
Other proposals which seem likely to increase creditor costs and thus
affect the price or volume of credit include the restriction of coercive
tactics available to creditors after default, abolition of deficiency and
default judgments, and article nine repossession. When high-risk debt-
ors are forced to forego credit because of such reforms, critics worried
about freedom of choice are likely to argue that high-risk debtors
should at least have the option of purchasing credit at a lower price
and at a higher risk of misfortune.5 2 These critics may well reject re-
formers' repeated warnings that consumers have a shortsighted bias in
favor of immediate gratification, lack bargaining strength, and are
likely to fall victim to advertising. When the cost of reform is not in-
ternalized within the credit transaction but subsidized by the govern-
ment instead, critics concerned with efficiency are likely to claim that
there are cheaper ways of maximizing social welfare and redistributing
wealth; and critics concerned with redistribution are likely to argue
that general taxpayers should not pay for the faults of a few culpable
debtors. These critics are in effect refusing to accept debtor difficulty
as a general misfortune falling upon various income groups at various
52. See also Consumer Finance Companies in COasu.mS L'srALumr CnErrr, supra
note 20, pt. III at 98-100.
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times, similar to job loss or temporary illness as an appropriate concern
of government.5 3
Thus, we can only indicate the appropriate questions that need to be
asked, highlighting those areas where more empirical work is needed.
Proposals for consumer credit reform abound. What is most needed
now is a willingness to evaluate them rationally, confining disagree-
ment to ultimate differences in values.
53. Caplovitz found that a very high proportion of his sample reported interruption
in income as the cause of default. Nearly half the sample individuals gave income loss
as one of several reasons for default and 43% of those sampled gave it as the first rea-
son. See D. CAPLOVIZ, supra note 7, at 5.1, 5.2. The role of illness in default Is unclear.
H. JACOB, supra note 11, at 52, finds that 90% of his sample reported doctors' bills In
their unpaid debts. Other studies reported large medical bills. See also E. REam. PER-
SONAL BANKRUPTCIES IN OREGON 95 (1967) (85% of bankrupts have medical bills, and they
account for 10% of total debt less real estate). Caplovitz finds that only 36%/ of his
sampled debtors indicated that overextension was an important cause of default and
therefore it was less important than income loss.
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